A Conceptual Framework to Study Socio-Technical Security by Ferreira, Ana et al.
Author’s version: The final publication is available at link.springer.com
A Conceptual Framework to Study
Socio-Technical Security
Ana Ferreira1,2, Jean-Louis Huynen1,2
Vincent Koenig1,2, and Gabriele Lenzini2?
1 Institute of Cognitive Science and Assessment - Univ. of Luxembourg
2 Interdisciplinary Centre for Security Reliability and Trust - Univ. of Luxembourg
Abstract. We propose an operational framework for a social, technical
and contextual analysis of security. The framework provides guidelines
about how to model a system as a layered set of interacting elements,
and proposes two methodologies to analyse technical and social vulner-
abilities. We show how to apply the framework in a use case scenario.
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1 Introduction
Systems that are secure even when used by humans –a property that we call
effective security– are hard to make. A system can embed technical mechanisms
that make it technically secure, such as encryption protocols, but those mech-
anisms can fail if users bypass or misuse them. Such failures are common since
humans do not perceive security as a primary goal [1] and do not properly assess
risks when using information communication technology [2, 3]. There is more:
computer system designers, with a few exceptions [4], are not accustomed to
count human cognitive and behavioural traits as risk factors in the security re-
quirements. Thus, even systems that have been validated as technically secure,
may still be insecure against non-technical attacks (e.g., social engineering) re-
maining oblivious of socio-technical vulnerabilities.
How can we achieve a better effective security? There is no once-and-for-
all solution. Effective security is a complex quality to achieve. It is inherently
socio-technical (it depends on how human and technical aspects integrate) and
it may be context and culture (incl. education) dependent [5, 6]. For example,
in hospitals, access control solutions cannot be effective unless designed to fit
the nomadic, interrupted, and cooperative nature of the medical work [7]. But,
the same access control solutions would be judged differently in a context such
as a bank, where employees work mostly alone and where security requirements
must consider, for example, threats coming from hackers (e.g., see [8]).
To make a system effectively secure in different scenarios, it likely requires
diverse strategies and solutions. However, it is possible to refer to a common
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framework of analysis. Such a framework should help computer security designers
and social scientists to collaborate by providing an operational guideline for an
interdisciplinary approach in studying a system’s security, as well as tools and
methodologies for questioning security at both the technical and the social layers.
Contribution. This paper proposes and describes such framework. STEAL (Socio-
TEchnical Attack AnaLysis) appears from the need to have a common systematic
framework matured from previous experiences the authors had in modelling and
analysing socio-technical security [9, 10].
2 Related Work
Zhu et al. [11] study how an attacker manages to influence the human to take
the wrong decision and acquire his private information. They simulate a scenario
where an attacker plays successfully the norm of reciprocity (mutual messages
exchange with the user) with the victims who are shopping online with mobile
devices. However, this study is incipient and does not provide a systematic way
to test and mitigate this or other similar norms. STEAL could model the norm of
reciprocity scenario with an overview of all the interactions and maybe provide
defences that could be applied in different parts of the system, and not only
within the human-computer interface dialogue.
Cranor et al. [12, 13] propose a framework to understand how security fail-
ures happen when users misbehave because of flawed human-computer commu-
nications. This framework is a sequence of generic steps the designer follows
to identify potential failure points for each technical function of the system,
where the user participates. The designer needs to mitigate those failures, either
by eliminating user’s intervention altogether if possible, or improving user’s in-
teraction. However, there is no specific model/methodology to reproduce both
the sequential or the mitigation process and to enable/operationalize scientific-
experimental research. Moreover, Cranor’s research assumes to know exactly
how a technical function will be used by a human and tries to improve it before
its usage. So humans are bound by the technology and how a function can be
performed, but this may not always be true. The next two works also assume
this. Conti et al. [14] research on visualization systems that typically include the
human in the decision-making loop and present a visual taxonomy to identify at-
tacks. Falk et al. [15] examine the prevalence of user-visible security design flaws
in high security requirements’ financial websites, and present a methodology to
testing these issues: selecting the most common five security user-visible flaws
of website design and identify them in a set of websites. All the above works
study the interactions between the user and the computer interface, mostly clar-
ifying usability questions, and not so much enquire about security in all systems’
functions and interactions.
Our framework, instead, provides for the design and analysis of socio-technical
attacks to the system’s functions, humans, context and all its interactions. An
attack may exploit bad communications’ design but may also ignore technical
functions altogether and focus on the context or the human to perform a suc-
cessful attack. Moreover, although much research on security usability has been
done, these studies are also mostly technology driven.
Other works justify the importance of contextual factors in systems’ secu-
rity in both ATM [16] and hospital authentication solutions [7]. STEAL also
integrates context and its interactions in the security analysis.
Regarding social engineering, Janczewski et al. [17] review social engineering
incidents to give a schematic representation of vulnerabilities usually exploited
by social engineers and the attack methodology that better succeeds. Dalpiaz [18]
has developed a Socio-Technical Security modelling language which specifies the
security and trustworthiness requirements for cross-organizational systems.
Worton et al. [19] apply a socio-technical framework to two terrorism scenar-
ios. It groups generic factors like people, goals, technology, culture, buildings,
and its characteristics. It is not possible to have a clear overview of how the
groups interact and how these interactions could, for instance, generate new
threats. Pavkovic and Perkov [20] present SET (for Social Engineering Toolkit),
a set of tools to perform advanced attacks against the human element. STEAL
could be used to analyse these attacks in more detail.
In summary, we have not found studies that tackle the specific challenge
proposed in this paper: to describe a framework providing a common systematic
process to analyse the security of socio-technical and contextual factors together
with all its interactions. To fulfil this gap, this paper proposes such framework
and gives recommendations on how to apply it.
3 A socio-technical security conceptual framework
By a socio-technical security conceptual framework, we mean an operational
guideline for a systematic approach in modelling and analysing a system’s secu-
rity in its technical and social perspectives. Past research in security validation
shows that important elements of such a framework are (I) a reference model
and (II) a set of procedural methodologies. (I) is to describe, at a suitable level
of abstraction, the elements of the system that we intend to analyse. (II) is to
have tools for a technical and a social experimental analysis of security.
STEAL, our framework, includes them both (see Fig. 1). Its reference model
(see Sec. 3.1) suggests a system as composed by interacting elements/actors (hu-
man, interfaces, processes, and context). Its set of methodologies (see Sec. 3.2)
includes security validation procedures coming from the formal analysis of secu-
rity protocols and from the applied cognitive sciences and usability research.
3.1 STEAL: reference model
It is a variant of the Bella et al.’s [21] concertina model (Fig. 1, upper part).
A socio-technical system is abstractly seen as layered, each layer made of com-
municating/interacting elements. There is at least a human persona, say Alice
Fig. 1. STEAL Conceptual Framework.
(PA), and the technology she is using. This is further composed by at least a hu-
man interface (UIA) and some software processes (pA). Processes can, through
a network, communicate with other processes (pB), behind which may stay one
or more humans, say Bob (PB), who are in turn interfaced to human interfaces
(UIB). Layers can be folded, with the effect that not all elements need to be
necessarily in place. Representing our system in this way helps the analyst to
select the key components for analysis, and to distinguish between the technical,
the human components and the context.
STEAL extends this model by adding the context (CA), and attack and
defence models. Context is the physical or social environment where the interac-
tions for ‘Alice’ take place. CA influences how A’s self (SA, in Fig. 1) expresses
into PA’s, the way PA interacts with the interface, and the software, which can
be context-dependent. CB does the same on B’s side, not shown in the figure.
This simple reference model fits many scenarios. For example, in a ATM ma-
chine scenario, Alice (PA) is the client, the user interface (UIA) is the ATM’s set,
and pA is the software executing the client instruction that connects the ATM
with the bank (pB). The context (CA) is where the ATM is located, a street or
the interior of a bank’s hall. In a scenario where Alice is accessing a protected
web page, the web interface is (UIA), the browser is the process pA that runs a
protocol with the web server hosting the page, which is process (pB). The con-
text CA can be Alice in her office, or in an airport’s hall. In a scenario with a few
persons collaboratively editing a file in the cloud, the persons are the Alices and
Bobs, their screens and keyboards the human-computer interfaces, the software
they use to edit and to browse are the processes. The communication happens
via the cloud service. The context can be where those persons are, at work, at
home, the latter being not only the location but also social environments.
Attack and defence models. STEAL comes also with an attack and with a
defence model. They are both relevant for the security analysis, as security is
always evaluated with respect to an attacker with specific capabilities (resp.,
a defender with specific capabilities). The icons O (attacks) and 	 (defences)
indicate where the model assumes attacks can strike and where defences can
act.
Whatever the nature of the channels and the messages they carry, an attacker
can intercept, modify and inject messages in any of those channels. These are
typical abilities ascribed to a Dolev-Yao intruder [22]. However, differently from
the classical Dolev-Yao, in STEAL, the attacker controls not only the network
but also the interactions between the application, the user’s interfaces, the per-
sona, and the context. Therefore, an attack may be technical and or a social
engineering kind of attack.
Defences also act by interfering with the communication channels. This in-
cludes the channels with the user. In our framework, users can participate to
improve security, a substantial difference between our and other works [13].
Other assumptions. Our reference model assume that the observable be-
haviour of the system’s elements under analysis is (at least at the level of ab-
straction chosen) known. However, it does not assume, and does not depend on,
the reasons, or the logic, behind this behaving be necessarily understood. This
assumption endorses a computational approach. A component (whatever it is,
human, interface, agent or context) is an entity (an automaton) that behaves ac-
cording to a certain control logic that determines its input, output and internal
actions depending on its state and on its (previous) inputs.
For example, a user at an ATM machine, behaves according to some beliefs,
desires and intentions that he/she has (withdraw money) which, according to
his/her state of mind (I have inserted a pin and wait for the money to come out),
determine the actions he/she does (taking the money once out). In its turn the
ATM machine’s logic is its software code, its state is the machine’s state (pin
inserted, now checking it), and its actions (display selection of banknotes).
In practice, we may not be able to define precisely a component’s control
logic, or to list the full set of actions it can ever perform, or to know the compo-
nent’s state in time. But, to build a sufficiently consistent picture (i.e., model)
of the component’s observable behaviour, one can apply indirect methods to
inquire properties about an element’s state and to test propositions about it,
or by observing the actions it does. For example, we can build a model of a
browser by looking at its code. In this case we know fully how it works. If the
code is proprietary, we may not be able to fully know its logic but we can build a
consistent model by walking through its behaviour. Similarly, we can observe a
user interacting with our browser, but we may not be able to observe him chang-
ing his mental state (e.g., cognitive process), nor knowing why users behave in
certain ways. We can only observe and ask him (e.g., questionnaire/interview).
This assumption is also motivated by the tools of analysis we are going to
have: tools for a formal analysis such as model checkers, for the technical secu-
rity, and human computer interactions methodologies, as those used in usability
laboratories, for the social security.
3.2 Methodologies for socio-technical security analysis
STEAL has two methodologies for security analysis. One is apt to understand
the security properties without considering a complex model of user’s behaviour.
The other is apt to question hypotheses on human behaviour and on security
properties with the human in the loop.
The two methodologies, together, make the socio-technical analysis possible.
The technical analysis helps, against specific threats, discovering if attacks are
possible. However, their effectiveness may depend on some user’s decisions, ex-
actly as it happens with TLS authentication, where a user may decide to proceed
despite a warning flashing that the certificate is invalid. The experimental analy-
sis answers whether those attack would be successful with real users and factual
behavioural patterns. The outcomes of the social-oriented analysis also enlighten
us on what factors influence critical decisions that may lead to attacks. Such out-
comes may therefore suggest defences which, in turn, can be implemented at a
technical or a social level or as a combination of them, and understanding their
effectiveness triggers another round of analysis. Moreover, it is also possible to
perform a security analysis against attacks purely against the human, like social
engineering. At the current status of research there is not a stable theory able
to model such attacks in a formal model way, thus to study their effect is again
done experimentally. This can change in the near future.
To test hypothesis of user’s behaviour under socio attacks, we may need to
launch such those attacks and harvest the data for analysis. This requires an
authorization from an ethical committee and a compliance with a legal frame-
work, assurances that strictly must comply with ethical requirements (APA). In
certain situations this may be hard to achieve.
Technical focus - this methodology helps discovering whether an attack is present,
within the defined threat model, and mostly with technical interactions and a
simple user model. The technical security analysis is applied to elements from
UIA till pA and possibly pB till UIB , including the context(s). PA is modelled as
a non-deterministic process i.e., interacting with process UIA in every possible
way [23, 24, 9]. The technical analysis, can use formal tools of protocol analysis
(e.g., model checking [25]), with the only difference that communications are
now multi-layered. In a simple case, the analysis can be pursued informally.
Analysing security in this focus means to verify whether specific security
properties remain valid despite an intruder. The technical analysis may reveal
vulnerabilities due to a faulty integration between the technical and the human
layers, like it happens when a system does not offer users to change a password,
when it should (e.g., [21]). The output of the technical analysis gives ground for
a successive security analysis with social-focus, as it provides information about
what attacks should be considered there.
Social focus - this methodology helps discovering security failures in the human
interactions, when a predefined threat model is present, or in presence of spe-
cific attacks revealed by the technical analysis. The social analysis focuses on
Fig. 2. Social focus: the hypothetico-deductive research model.
human behaviour and choices, therefore from elements SA till UIA and possibly
their human-to-human interaction with SB via UIB , including the context(s).
The social analysis uses the hypothetico-deductive model from empirical social
sciences research [26] (Fig. 2).
Briefly, the process starts with the initial definition of research questions to
be tested. These usually come from previous literature review, insights either
observed or hinted by human computer interactions. In STEAL they should
come from the technical security analysis itself. The process continues with the
definition of the most appropriate research methodology/ies (i.e., laboratory ex-
periments, interviews, surveys) to answer the research question. Here we also
decide on the appropriate threat model and the layers that can be impacted in
the reference model. This process is similar if we are testing defences. The next
step is to design and implement the selected methodology(ies) with the goal of
making this process reproducible over a series of experimental tests. After all is
set and ready to start, the experiment is run and output data is collected and fur-
ther analysed. Usually, data can be analysed using both quantitative (statistical
tools can be used to analyse data and test previous defined research questions,
and show how significant these are) and qualitative methods (qualitative data
gathered from the participants can be correlated with results obtained from
statistical analysis and also provide insight or explanation on user’s behaviour).
4 Running example: applying STEAL
We describe how STEAL works with a scenario of a visitor at the Univ. of
Luxembourg trying to get WiFi Internet access by choosing an open SSID name
from the list he is presented by his device’s network manager.
4.1 Reference model
STEAL reference model highlights the elements of the scenario (Fig. 3), com-
prising the network manager and all the network communication protocols (pA),
the interface on the user’s mobile device (UIA) and the user trying to select
a wireless network name to connect to the Internet (PA). The premises of the
University of Luxembourg, the place where all is happening, is the context CA.
About the interactions, express would be the expression of all the human
traits of a persona into how PA takes security decisions when interacting with
human︷ ︸︸ ︷ computer︷ ︸︸ ︷ network︷ ︸︸ ︷
	2 	3 	4 O	5
SA express PA interaction UIA events pA protocol . . .
m m 	1 m m
CA
Fig. 3. Reference model for WiFi connection to the Internet.
a human-computer interface in that particular scenario. (We are not able to
model those expressions, but we may want to consider them in the analysis).
Then, interaction are the actions performed by the user, to access the wireless
network manager’s list and select an SSID name to connect; events are the
communications exchanged between the user’s interface on the mobile device and
the wireless network manager application and the wireless access point, which
manages calls to its network; protocol are the network protocols and messages
exchanged between the wireless network manager application and wireless access
point, which manages all accesses to the services that its network provides.
4.2 Socio-technical security analysis
Technical analysis - We model the technical layers in a UML diagram. It
illustrates the sequence of actions between those elements during an attack in
this scenario (Fig. 4). In theory is possible to run a formal analysis against a
Dolev-Yao attacker. Here, it is immediately evident that an intruder can open a
rogue wireless access point because the SSID is not authenticated.
The success of the attack relies only on the user’s choice, precisely on whether
a user will actually choose the rogue access point or not. This cannot be under-
stood with this technical analysis only. However, we elaborate more on the attack
before passing to the social analysis. We hypothesise that the context plays a
very important role in this scenario as the attacker can use the University’s visual
identity –and all that is connected with it such as knowledge, reputation, etc– to
lure a victim to choose a rogue but meaningful name, such as “uni.lu”, over the
University’s official SSID names (actually “uni-visitor” and “eduroam”). The at-
tacker can also set up a second SSID, “secure AP”, a name recalling “security”
and test which name has more appeal for the user. Fig. 4 shows the attack.
Social analysis - to apply the hypothetico-deductive model for this analysis
we devised the following stages (more detail in [10]): (1) Research question: do
context and trust influence users’ choice of a wireless network name? Alias do
names reminding security influence that choice? (2) Methodology : on-line survey
with two different groups of questions (one relating to context and the other
to trust) each together with open questions to provide further explanation of
the participant’s selection. The groups of questions must be answered by two
different groups of participants (in a between subjects design) regarding wireless
network names preferences and graded using a Likert scale (1 - less trusted/less
preferred to 5 - highly trusted/preferred); (3) Design and implement the experi-
ment : the survey included a list of 12 wireless network names is compiled based
on: they exist in the region where the study was conducted, non-existing, evoca-
tive of security or freeness and location/context-specific. The participants should
be randomly associated with either the first or the second group of questions (be-
tween subjects design); (4) Run the experiment : send an email to the staff of the
University of Luxembourg; (5) Analysis: Data was collected, then analysed using
R statistical tool. Basic descriptive statistics were applied followed by t-test and
wilcoxon rank test. We actually run such an experiment in [10]).
Main results: The social analysis confirms the hypothesis that SSID names
reminding the context influence choices, but when users are unaware, or have
not been instructed to use the official SSIDs. However, the study refutes the
hypothesis that users trust names recalling “security”.
Fig. 4. Technical Focus: the UML sequence diagram for the WiFi connection to the
Internet with an intruder attacking the network.
4.3 Adding defences
After having identified possible attacks, we may devise possible defences. We
sketch some of them in the reminder of this paragraph. Defences can act at
the technical layers or at the social layers. For example, if all wireless access
points were strongly authenticated by the user’s device, then the identified at-
tack would not occur. This is likely the case with the new Hotspot 2.0, where
the device’s SIM card embeds the certificate of proprietary access points. The
network manager, pA, can be programmed to disable the ‘join()’ action on all
networks that have not been vouched by the university’s system administrator
(	4, Fig. 3). Another technical defence can be implemented at the Network
layer by monitoring the live SSIDs, and spot whether some new SSID is trying
to use the name of the context (e.g., the “uni.lu” SSID). Technically it is possi-
ble to disrupt the joining process to newcomer SSID by sending spoofed deauth
packets. This action has the effect of disabling the ‘join()’ function (	5).
If no technical solution is feasible, defences can be applied at the social lay-
ers or to the context. For example, stickers can be left all over the University
campus, advertising the legitimate access point of the University (	1). This may
likely increase user’s awareness. The University can give training to its employees
to help them recognize rogue SSIDs (	2). The network manager and the user
interface can have a trust indicator displayed aside each SSID (	3).
Whether these defences are effective in successfully decreasing the number
of people that fall victim of the attack herein described, is a research question
that should be tested by new runs of our framework.
5 Discussion
Conflicts between security and usability are a well known problem. What this
paper intends to highlight is that effective security should be the result of a mul-
tidisciplinary research. Computer scientists and social scientists must collaborate
on similar ground and terminology to study a system’s security in an integrated
fashion. Security analysis must comprise technical, social and contextual ele-
ments. Although the literature has plenty of interesting studies on usability and
security, we miss a common operational framework to systematically perform an
analysis of security tackling both technical and social aspects.
STEAL comprises a model of a socio-technical scenario and suggests method-
ologies to analyse and test the same scenario for its security. It helps modelling
socio-technical attack scenarios too. At the moment, the methodologies for both
technical and social security analysis are working in a pipeline, and allows more
runs of analysis. The technical analysis justifies the presence of technical at-
tacks, and the social analysis give ground to evaluate the effectiveness when
user’s decisions are in place with those attacks. The technical analysis cannot,
at the moment, help with attacks of purely social nature, because there is no
model able to express and simulate them. The same relates to mature human be-
haviour: there are no stable human behavioural models that can be used within
an automatic security validation tool. Defining such a model must, however, be
supported by experimental research.
It is not a primary goal of STEAL to build a model for understanding why
users behave the way they do. However, it is possible to use STEAL to design and
perform experiments that focus on understanding why some users fall victims of
a specific socio-technical attack, by following some behavioural patterns. Such
findings may inspire defences, whose effectiveness can be tested in STEAL.
We showed here how to apply our framework in a specific socio-technical
scenario. However, we need more examples to be more confident about the flexi-
bility of the approach. Regarding our reference model, this has been shown as we
applied it to model socio-technical scenario about users accessing the Internet [9,
10], but more scenarios are needed to validate the actual flexibility. About the
technical security analysis, it can be applied generically once all components of a
socio-technical system, together with its interactions, are modelled as suggested.
The main issue to consider is the human behavioural analysis, and if STEAL can
help to generalize this analysis for a large set of scenarios. We believe that the
methodology used for the social analysis (hypothetico-deductive experimental
model) is generic enough to be applied in the design and implementation of user
related experiments for socio-technical systems. In order to perform the security
analysis, all the steps of that process need to be clearly and objectively defined.
It may be the case that we can only test one interaction, and therefore, one hy-
pothesis at a time. Still, its analysis uses methods that either confirm or dismiss
that hypothesis. Once we know this answer we can step to the next question
or generate some conclusion. This is still generic and prone to be adapted to
different socio-technical scenarios. As discussed in the methodology, some ex-
periment may need authorization from an ethical committee, compliance with a
legal framework, and with ethical requirements (APA), before being set.
6 Conclusion
We believe that STEAL is a good first step in the integration of socio-technical
security analysis by a multidisciplinary team. Nevertheless, there is the need
to apply STEAL to model and analyse more socio-technical scenarios. Only
this way will it be possible to improve STEAL and enrich its flexibility and
generalization. As future work we plan to use STEAL to design and test the
devised socio-technical defences for each scenario and verify whether they work
or need further revision.
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